China's Proposed Solar Technology Export Curbs Could Test India's Self-Reliance Push

China has moved to tighten control over the know-how behind its solar manufacturing dominance, a step that could complicate India’s effort to build a self-reliant photovoltaic (PV) supply chain. On 16 October 2026, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and Ministry of Science and Technology issued Announcement No. 48 of 2026, proposing to add 12 PV technologies to the country’s Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited and Restricted from Export. The draft is open for public comment until 15 November 2026, but a temporary pre-export registration requirement has already taken effect.

What China has proposed

The draft covers 40 technologies across artificial intelligence, biomedicine and photovoltaics. According to MOFCOM, 14 are proposed for an outright export ban and 26 for restricted export, which would require a government licence. The 12 PV entries cover polysilicon, silicon wafer and solar cell manufacturing, and the scope extends to key and core equipment that carries these technologies.

Among the items named by the ministry, production technology for perovskite and tandem solar cell modules falls in the prohibited category, while polysilicon engineering technology for single production lines of 30,000 tonnes per year or more falls in the restricted category. Most listed technologies are defined by specific technical thresholds, and those below the thresholds can still be exported freely.

Beijing’s rationale

A MOFCOM spokesperson said PV technologies are increasingly being used in aerospace, defence, unmanned systems and high-security infrastructure, raising the national security risks linked to their export. The ministry described the revision as routine, said it does not target any specific country, and clarified that products made using the controlled technologies fall outside its scope. PV equipment not named in the announcement is, in principle, not covered.

The spokesperson also noted that transfers of key PV technology usually accompany the export, installation, commissioning, improvement and upgrading of production lines, and that such activities would require a technology export licence. Until the catalogue is finalised, Chinese firms must register technology transfers abroad, overseas licensing arrangements and changes of ownership or control to foreign entities, including deals already under way.

Why India is exposed

Because the curbs target technology rather than finished goods, imports of modules, cells and wafers are not directly affected. The pressure point for India lies in its effort to build upstream manufacturing capacity, where it still depends heavily on imports.

In a reply to the Lok Sabha on 22 July 2026, the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) said that around 42 GW of module, 11.5 GW of cell and about 2 GW of ingot-wafer capacity had been set up under the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme for high-efficiency solar PV modules, against letters of award for around 48.3 GW of integrated capacity. No operational polysilicon capacity was reported. The same reply showed progress on imports, with solar module imports falling from about USD 4,354 million in 2023-24 to about USD 994 million in 2025-26.

India’s policy framework is now pushing manufacturers further up the value chain. MNRE’s ALMM List-II for solar cells came into force on 1 June 2026, requiring ALMM-listed modules in covered projects to use domestically enlisted cells. A memorandum dated 18 July 2026 ruled out a blanket extension and allowed only net-metering and open-access projects to commission without List-II cells until 31 December 2026.

The government has also announced ALMM List-III for ingots and wafers, effective 1 June 2028. MNRE has described this stage as heavily import-dependent, noting India’s limited domestic wafer manufacturing capacity. At the time of that announcement in March 2026, ALMM List-I covered around 172 GW of module capacity, against 27 GW of cell capacity under List-II. China’s proposed controls on polysilicon, wafer and cell manufacturing technologies therefore fall in exactly the segments India is now mandating domestically.

The licensing requirement for production-line exports, installation, commissioning and upgrades is particularly relevant. Indian manufacturers that rely on Chinese suppliers for complete lines or technical support could face longer timelines and greater uncertainty, especially for upstream projects that must be ready before the List-III deadline.

The ban on perovskite and tandem technologies carries a longer-term implication. These are widely seen as the next efficiency step beyond conventional silicon, and India would have to develop them largely through its own research or non-Chinese partnerships.

The road ahead

The draft does not shut the door entirely. Restricted technologies can still be transferred under licence, and the final catalogue may change after consultation. The interim registration requirement, however, is already in force and could add compliance steps and delays to deals currently in progress.

NITI Aayog’s report, Key Sectors to Position India as a Global Manufacturing Hub, released on 13 August 2026, identifies solar PV as a priority sector and calls for stronger upstream capabilities to reduce import dependence. Its priorities include technology partnerships and joint ventures, greater R&D and performance-linked support, integrated clean-tech clusters and industry-led skilling. China’s proposal makes these measures more urgent. With India needing to add about 174 GW to reach its 2030 target of 280 GW of solar capacity, access to manufacturing technology, not just production capacity, is likely to determine how quickly the upstream gap closes.

Indian manufacturers planning integrated wafer-to-module facilities will be watching the final catalogue closely.